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 I have titled these remarks “The Implications of Ordinality” because ordinality is 
the philosophic concept that most generally characterizes Justus Buchler’s work. It is not, 
however, his only distinctive concept. His theory of  judgment, and the attendant 
approach to experience, are also both unique and profound, as are the categories such as 
proception through which  he understands human being. At the more general 
metaphysical level Buchler introduced another important concept or principle, that of 
ontological parity, which also goes a long way to distinguishing his philosophical 
perspective from most others. In these pages I would like to consider the principle of 
ontological parity as well as the general concept of ordinality and their implications for 
my own thinking and for philosophy in general. 
 Buchler was an unapologetic metaphysician, and at a time when metaphysics was 
rapidly becoming unfashionable, and in fact an object of derision by a growing number of 
philosophers. The schools of thought that grew out of Russell, Wittgenstein and Carnap 
had already by the middle of Buchler’s career rendered marginal the kind of philosophy 
to which he was dedicated. Metaphysics had come to be regarded as a sterile 
manipulation of concepts and ideas that led to nothing that could legitimately be 
considered knowledge or insight. Toward the end of his career, though too late for him to 
address it, the variety of post modernist ideas developed a similar hostility toward 
metaphysics, though for different reasons. Metaphysics, the post modernists have said, is 
an illegitimate attempt to force the varieties of being and experience into a single mold, 
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and what’s worse, tends to represent at the intellectual level something similar to 
imperialism at the social. From the one side metaphysics is rejected for being 
meaningless, and from the other for being oppressive. The result has been that Buchler’s 
work itself, and that of those whose thought has been influenced by it, are overlooked 
nearly entirely in contemporary philosophy. 
 Both sets of reasons for rejecting traditional metaphysics have their merits. 
Traditional philosophy has often attempted to read all of reality through its own more 
narrowly focused lens: Descartes through the developing physics and mathematics of the 
early modern period, or Hegel through his sense of the superiority of modern European 
civilization. The post modernists have a point. Similarly, it is difficult to object to the 
claim that far too often traditional metaphysical philosophy has amounted to a 
manipulation of concepts to no apparent effect. Nonetheless, the post modernist and 
analytic traditions have overstated their respective cases, and their failure to appreciate 
the value of metaphysics in Buchler’s sense of the term and its useful implications has 
been to the detriment of contemporary philosophy. 
 Metaphysics, as Buchler understood it, is the attempt to develop the most 
appropriate general categories applicable to a given subject matter. When that subject 
matter is reality in general, metaphysics becomes ontology. When the subject matter is 
more circumscribed, it becomes the “metaphysics of…,” i.e. human being, or art, or as 
Buchler himself could put it, of baseball. That is, the philosophical study of any subject 
matter, if it intends to elucidate characteristics of its subject, requires that we bring to 
bear some set of general concepts. Metaphysics is simply the reflective development and 
articulation of those concepts.  
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 It is in his general ontology, in the metaphysics of “whatever is in whatever way,” 
that the principle of ontological parity and the concept of ordinality have their place. The 
principle of ontological parity asserts, simply, that nothing is “more real” than anything 
else. There is a great deal packed into this claim. Most importantly it helps us to avoid the 
temptation to assume that some things are ontologically more significant than others. 
Traditional idealists, for example, will claim either that material reality is less real than 
the spiritual, or they will go so far as to claim that the material is illusory altogether. 
Similarly, most forms of materialism make the same mistake only the other way round, 
by regarding spirit either as ontologically less significant than matter or as an illusion. By 
itself, the principle of ontological parity does not refute any of these claims. But it does 
indicate a different point of departure. It suggests that the proper role of the philosopher 
is not to deprecate or to argue out of existence any aspects of the world or experience as 
they are encountered. On the contrary, the role of the philosopher is to understand these 
aspects of the world and of experience. The more fruitful philosophical inquiry, in this 
spirit, is one that attempts to sort out the relations of the universal and the particular, of 
matter and spirit, of mind and body, of knowledge and experience, of poetry and science, 
of the religious and the secular, of the individual and the social. When we give up the 
inclination to regard some aspects of nature as ontologically more significant than others, 
and by psychological if not logical implication, as more important in general, then we are 
far more likely to encounter, appreciate and possibly even understand nature in its 
diversity, its richness, and in its complexity. This is, for me, the most significant and 
philosophically valuable implication of the principle of ontological parity. 
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 To begin from the point of view that nothing is more real than anything else is in 
fact related to the concept of ordinality. If the point of philosophical inquiry is not to 
argue away this or that aspect of nature but on the contrary to understand nature in its 
diversity and complexity, then in all likelihood we will have to understand the various 
aspects of nature in their relations with one another. This, anyway, is the assumption of 
ordinality. In other words, the concept suggests that it will be most intellectually fruitful 
to understand all aspects of nature, whether general or particular, ideal or material, 
whether a human product or not, whether actual or possible, whether identified through 
science, poetry, mathematics, literature, music, painting, sculpture, or with a steam 
shovel, as possessing the traits that they do, as having their nature, so to speak, in sets of 
relations with other aspects, or what Buchler called “complexes” of nature. The term 
“ordinality” derives from the concept of “order,” which Buchler defined as “a sphere of 
relatedness.” To say that nature is ordinal is to say that all its complexes are relational in 
nature. The role of the philosopher, then, at least in the metaphysical process, is to 
elucidate the relations that lead to the “natural definition” of any complex or aspect of 
nature. 
 This is an unusual position in the history of philosophy, and in my experience it is 
usually met either with derision or more benignly with disbelief. Nonetheless, its value, I 
would argue, is considerable. Most importantly, it makes it much more likely that in the 
study of any subject matter we will take into account its many constituents. We are not 
forced, as the alternative approach inclines us to be, to argue away this or that potentially 
relevant aspect of a subject in order to identify its core, or substance, or essence. If any 
complex simply is its constituents in some specific set of relations with one another, then 
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our inclination is to pursue rather than avoid its constituents. Thus we are more likely to 
avoid the reductionist tendencies of a good deal of traditional and contemporary 
philosophy. This in turn helps us to come to grips with the fact that every subject matter 
is probably more complex than we might like it to be. Consider, to select one general area 
of philosophic inquiry, the social sphere. A great deal of ink has been spilled attempting 
to show that social reality is “really” a matter of discrete individuals interacting in one 
way or another, or that it is really a “social” matter in which individuals play a less 
significant role; or that a particular social problem is at bottom a problem of individual 
morality, or at bottom a problem of social relations. If we approach problems like these 
from an ordinal point of departure we are far less inclined to try to argue away one or 
another aspect of social reality or social problems, since we have begun with the 
assumption that the subject in question is by definition the set of relations in which all its 
constituents are located. For me this has proved an invaluable insight, and I suspect that it 
would be for others as well if they would allow themselves the opportunity to grasp it. 
 Finally, and I have made this point in several places in print, ordinality would go 
a long way to rectifying the excesses of a good deal of contemporary philosophy and to 
finding common ground among the intellectual styles of philosophy as it is currently 
practiced. Philosophy in the analytic vein tends to accept the traditional modernist 
assumption of the objectivity of the world and the capacity of inquiry, especially science 
and mathematics, to reveal its nature. Philosophy of the more post modernist sort tends to 
emphasize the creative aspects of human experience and interaction with nature, and the 
inherent limits of human access to the world, and the twain do not often meet. This is 
both unfortunate and unnecessary, because in crucial respects both are right. It is a virtue 
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of ordinality that it expresses an understanding of nature in which it is possible to 
understand how both can be right. If the complexes of nature are by definition relational, 
then those complexes that are related to human being will have their nature defined in 
part by the role played by human beings in their constitution. This is the creative place of 
human being in nature. At the same time, however, there is nothing mystical or uniquely 
subjective about this. The complexes of nature are what they are, not by the fiat of any 
person or by result of human inquiry, but by the relations that stand among their 
constituent complexes. Those constituents may include human beings, but that fact does 
not render the relations any less “objective.” In other words, nature as understood 
ordinally is such as to suggest both human creativity and “natural definition,” or 
objectivity. These are not mutually exclusive approaches to nature, and for me the 
greatest service that ordinality as a concept plays to show how this is the case. 
